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Book Review
International Law & Ethnic Conflict
By David Wippman
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 354
REVIEWED BY SATVINDER S. JUSS"
Good books are a blessing, and blessings are far and between, which is why
David Wippman is to be commended for having assembled an engrossing
collection of contributions on international law and ethnic conflict.' Wippman's
book is not simply a collection of essays, but a voyage of discovery, a glimpse
into a new trend in international law. The book is about how we see, and should
see, ethnic conflict in the world today. The wealth of information and the
thought-provoking commentary in its contributions compel the reader to
consider how ethnicity influences the international system. Only in the 1990s
have theories of international relations begun to address the issues ofethnicity,
self-determination, and nationalist sentiment.2
Ethnic nationalism received treatment in the current decade when issues of
self-determination and succession rose dramatically at the end of the Cold War.
International lawyers had rarely addressed these concerns except from a purely
historical approach. They asserted that the principle of self-determination was
the legal and moral foundation of decolonization. Its postcolonial application
was much less certain. Before this decade, self-determination was recognized
for those groups of people who were under colonial, alien, or racist domination.
International lawyers thought that this principle could not apply to the
population of a sovereign State under a government that prohibited systematic
* Barrister-at-Law, 6 King's Bench Walk, Temple, London, EC4Y 7DR, England, United Kingdom;
Ph.D., Cantab; Visiting Professor of Law& Visiting Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Center for the Study
of Global Change, Indiana University-Bloomington (1998); Harkness Fellow & Visiting Human Rights
Fellow, Harvard Law School (1997).
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHmNIc CONFLIcT (David Wippman ed., 1998).
2. See, e.g., HURSTHANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DEERMINATION (1990); ETHNIC
CoNFLICrANDINTERNATIONALSECURrrY (Michael E. Browned., 1993); Jack Snyder, The New Nationalism:
Realist Interpretation and Beyond, in THE DoMESTC BASES OF GRAND STRATEGY 179-200 (Richard
Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 1993).
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racial or religious discrimination, even though it might on occasion be
oppressive. The principle of self-determination was restricted in this manner
because of the "fear of States that by authorizing an unqualified right of self-
determination they might allow secession and dismemberment in sovereign
States. '3 In the contemporary world, however, self-determination was claimed
more for its "internal" aspect (right to democratic self-government) than for its
"external" aspect (independence from foreign domination or control).4 Some
writers have advocated self-determination leading to succession,5 but it had not
been recognized as a legal principle by the time of the outbreak of hostilities in
1991 in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, "the idea of a principle or right
of self-determination is firmly embedded in the global consciousness," and
"today a multitude of indigenous ethnic, and other groups have invoked the
concept of self-determination in formulating demands against actual or
perceived oppression of the status quo."6
Today the principle of self-determination has scarcely any limitations on its
possible applications. Part of the value in Wippman's collection of essays lies
in its demonstration of some limitations. It has been said that "the indigenous
peoples rights movements is perhaps the most striking development in the theory
and practice of international law since the United Nations issued the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948."' The thrust of this movement has
focused on collective rights, as opposed to individual rights, which have hitherto
been the concern of international law. Emphasis on internal rights now
threatens established sovereign States: "[t]he flood of claims to internal self-
determination has been sweeping the globe, from the Canadian Northlands,
Quebec, and endangered Amazonian rainforests, to the embattled horn of
Africa, the Kurdistan of undying dreams, and the shaky post-communist States
3. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 134 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46(1992).
5. The most extensive legal approach is that of Lee C. Buchheit. LEE C. BucHHErT, SECESSION: THE
LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978). See also ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALIrY OF
POLmCAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SuMTER TO LrrHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); Ved P. Nanda, Self-
Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF-
DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DMENSIONS 193 (Yonah Alexander and Robert A.
Friedlander eds., 1980).
6. See S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm ofSelf-determination,
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 132 (1993). See also MORTON. H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-
DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 123-60 (1992).
7. See Allen Buchanan, The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples'Rights,
3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (1993).
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of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."8 Although ethnic conflict has
existed for a long time, the outbreak of ethnic rivalries in the former Soviet
Union and now in Central Africa has demanded greater attention in the last
decade. The lure of new challenges-in the form of new threats-to world
peace and order has become irresistible. Wippman's book deserves an audience
simply for having addressed this.
Other questions, however, deserve answers. For example, is ethnic conflict
different and, if so, how? The conceptual challenge is whether scholars and
policymakers can demonstrate the existence of a causal link between ethnic
nationalism and intrastate conflict. The escalating discord of the 1990s in the
former Yugoslavia has aptly demonstrated the need to address these questions.
The Balkans conflict led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
first out-of-area actions, the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation in
history, and the looming spectre of war spreading to other parts of the Balkans.
Yet, the dominant realist approach in international relations provided little
explanation for the violent ethnic conflict, although it was nothing new. At least
eleven million people have been killed since 1945 in ethnic struggles.' Ethnic
conflict is potentially a problem for all States because only a handful of States
are ethnically homogeneous. If it has gone unrecognized, it is at least partly
because liberal theory has long cherished the hope that ethnicity would
disappear as a significant political force under the leveling forces of
modernization.'"
It is a mistake to think that ethnic conflict only potentially affects distant
lands. Even the paradigm of liberal society, the United States, is not free from
ethnic claims. The United States case of Kiryas Joel in 1994 is a stark
reminder of the pressing claims of minority groups in contemporary liberal
societies." This case concerned a highly insular and traditional religious
community of orthodox Hasidic Jews. Their members worshiped and lived
together. In 1989, the New York legislature passed Chapter 748, which carved
out a public school district to preserve the cultural, linguistic, and religious
8. Peter Juviler, Contested Ground: Rights to Self-Determination and the Experience of the Former
Soviet Union, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 71, 72 (1993).
9. See Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International
Perspectives, 20 ANN. REv. Soc. 49, 51, 72 (1994).
10. See MILTON J. ESMAN, ETHNIc POLITICS 12, 17-18 (1994) (observing the hope that "in the wake of
economic development and nation-building, ascriptive loyalties would lose their social function and gradually
wither away" but that the reality is that modernization in facttends to "reinvigorate" rather than supplant ethnic
solidarities).
11. Board ofEduc. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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needs oftheir disabled children. New York's imaginative law allowed Hasidic
students to attend classes with members of their own sect in a familiar
atmosphere. The state law, however, allowed only teaching of secular subjects;
it forbade the teaching of the Hasidim's religious tenets. 2 Without imposing
any costs on other citizens, New York's legislature had adopted an avowedly
liberal approach in which the political and cultural majority set out to protect
the practices of an unconventional minority. Yet, the Supreme Court struck
down the statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the statute represented an
unconstitutional means ofproviding the disabled Satmar children with state and
federal special education services to which they were entitled by law. 3
The case has generated widespread commentary. 4 Some commentators
have tried to discuss the role of "enclave" groups, which seek to segregate
themselves from the larger community in a constitutional democracy." It has
been suggested that such groups have a positive role in nourishing democracies.
First, it is inherently discriminatory to privilege heterogenous groups over
homogenous groups for public governance. 6 Second, the democratic polity
owes it to certain enclave groups to allow them to exercise some power over
their own communities, because even the best run democracies will inevitably
create injustices for some of their members. 7 Third, the intrinsic value of
personal sovereignty itself dictates that we should retain individually the "right
or power to make decisions concerning central attributes of personhood."''
Although these arguments plausibly apply to the private sphere as a
necessary incident of democratic rights, they unlikely extend to publicly-
provided state education. First, it separates the community by providing
political entitlements to a group because of their distinctive collectivity and
"runs the risk of establishing and/or reinforcing castes in a polity that is
otherwise committed to eradicating caste as the basis for distributing basic
12. See id. at 690-96.
13. See id. at 709-10.
14. See, e.g., Joanne Kuhns, Note, Board ofEducation ofKiryas v. Grumet: The Supreme Court Shall
Make No Law Defining an Establishment of Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1599 (1995); Thomas C. Berg,
Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433
(1995); Susan E. Acklin, Note, BoardofEducation of Kiryas Joel Village SchoolDistrict v. Grumet: Another
Snub for Lemon Draws It Nearer To Its Probable Demise, 41 Loy. L. REv. 43 (1995).
15. For a discussion of "enclave" groups, see Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power, 1
CONSTELLATIONS 53 (1994).
16. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1996).
17. See Mansbridge, supra note 15, at 56.
18. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 50 (1995).
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political incidents.'" 9 Second, it misrepresents the political community because
"the presence of children from different parts of this larger community tells the
children in these classrooms that they share a political association with people
who are different from them."2 Finally, "when Satmar children receive a false
impression of who is in their political community, they also receive a false
impression about the skills they need to develop in order to negotiate their
public lives."'" These problems suggest that the intrinsic value of groups, as a
moral good, deserves greater consideration. Rights then acquirejustification by
referring back to a shared feature or common basis-namely, existence defined
in terms of personhood, communality, and sociality.'
Liberals have always mistrusted ethnic solidarities as a source of communal
conflict-a conflict between civic nationalism (i.e., cosmopolitan, inclusive,
liberal, democratic conceptions of the ideal polity) and ethnic nationalism (i.e.,
narrow, exclusivist, authoritarian notions). The conflicts in Azerbaijan, Bosnia,
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan amply demonstrate the Liberals' distrust of
ethnic claims. The Liberal perspective has suffered attack because it has failed
to promote human dignity fully. The scholarly writings of Communitarians
most notably question the central tenets of Liberal orthodoxy. Communitarians
maintain that liberal theorists grossly underestimate the centrality of ethnicity
and communal affiliation to personal identity because they overlook the
importance of culture and group. Liberal theory, they say, falsely treats
individuals as wholly autonomous agents when individuals actually exist as part
of a larger community and culture. The problem for international law, as
Wippman rightly recognizes at the outset of his book,23 is that it has never
resolved the tension between these antithetical doctrines.' Rather, liberal theory
has exercised strong influence on the norms of international law, establishing
the dominant paradigm that regulates questions of State formation, group
claims, and individual rights. Today, therefore, the international community has
no principled or fully coherent political or legal response to ethnonationalist
claims. Separatist claims produce haphazard and disjointed international
19. Judith Lynn Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a Constitutional
Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel, 72 IND. L.J. 383, 400 (1996).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 401.
22. See Ronald R. Garet, CommunalityandExistence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001,
1001-02 (1983).
23. WwPMAN, supra note 1, at 6.
24. Cf. Martii Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and
Practice, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 241,250 (1994).
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responses.25
What is surely needed is an evolving framework for group rights.
Arguments for what constitutes an ethnic group remain indeterminate, unclear,
and not necessarily helpful. The argument for the moral value of groups in the
best democratic societies is powerfully demonstrated by the British case of
Dawkins in 1993.26 This case demonstrates an unnecessary denial of the
common basis in personhood, communality, and sociality. Dawkins was a
Rastafarian, a movement that began in the 1930s, with the majority of their
adherents being Jamaicans. They shared geographical origin, common interests,
idiosyncratic tastes of literature, poetry, and music. They also shared distinct
customs, such as a refusal to cut hair, to shave, to observe dietary laws, and
prohibitions on homosexuality and contraception. They experienced life as
minorities, frequently oppressed because their distinctive appearance singled
them out for criticism. Dawkins filed an employment discrimination case when
an employer, a van driving company, offered him ajob but then required him
to cut his dreadJocks. His claim arose under the British Race Relations Act of
1976, which forbade discrimination against "a group of persons defined by
reference to... ethnic ... origins. ' 27 The employers conceded that Dawkins
had been refused employment because he was a Rastafarian. The employers,
however, denied that Rastafarians constituted a distinct ethnic group.28
The Industrial Tribunal upheld his complaint, observing that the movement
had maintained itself for the past sixty years and had a sufficient degree of
historical permanence. On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected
this view and held instead that Rastafarians constituted only a religious group.
They found insufficient evidence to distinguish them from the rest of the Afro-
Caribbean community. The Tribunal declared that "[i]t cannot reasonably be
said that a movement which goes back for only 60 years, i.e. within the living
memory of many people, can claim to be long in existence." '29 The Court of
Appeal upheld that view, arguing that although Rastafarians are a separate
group with identifiable characteristics, they have not established some separate
identity by reference to their ethnic origins. Under British law, they found that
"ethnic" has a racial flavor. Comparing Rastafarians with the rest of the
Jamaican community meant that there was nothing to set them aside as a
25. WIPPMAN, supra note 1, at 7.
26. Dawkins v. Dep't of the Env't, [1993] I.C.R. 284 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Crown Suppliers v. Dawkins, [1991] I.C.R. 583 (Employment App. Trib. 1993) (Tucker, J.).
[Vol. 6:371
BOOK REVIEW
separate ethnic group.3"
Although a case like this would almost certainly not occur in the United
States, because of the Freedom of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, it
nevertheless helps demonstrate how unredressed ethnic tensions can grow and
spill into the international arena without a proper framework of group rights as
a moral value for democratic society. The Court of Appeal in Dawkins
concluded that "it is not enough for Rastafarians now to look to a past when
their ancestors, in common with other peoples in the Caribbean, were taken
there from Africa. They were not a separate group then. . . .One can
understand and admire the deep affection which Rastafarians feel for Africa and
their longing for it as their real home. But... the Court is concerned with the
language of the statute."'" This case no doubt provided little comfort to
Dawkins and his community, having laid seeds of communal dissonance.
The post-Cold War era has exposed groups from ethnically-mixed regions
in the former crumbling empires. Ethnic nationalism begets ethnic conflict,
which risks spillage into the international arena. The creation of ethnically pure
States, however, is most decidedly not the answer. The twentieth century is
littered with examples ofthis, with grave threats to peace arising from partitions
of previously peaceful societies along ethnic or religious distinctions.32 This
acute paradox is a serious threat to international peace and stability, especially
as the number of ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts in the world steadily
increase. Yet, it is salutary to remember that violent interstate conflict is caused
not by ethnic sentiment, nor by external security concerns, but rather by the
dynamics of intragroup conflict.33 The external conflict, although justified and
described in terms of relations with other ethnic groups and taking place within
that context, has its main core within the State, among members of the same
ethnicity. The modem approach in international law fails to deal with ethnic
claims or with ethnic conflict adequately because it is basically focused on
external security concerns. Under this approach, the conflictive behavior in the
name of ethnic nationalism is a response to external threats to the State (or to
the ethnic group).34 What has not been squarely faced by modem scholars and
30. Id.
31. Dawkins, [1993] I.C.R. 284 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
32. The primary examples include Greece-Turkey (1922), Ireland (1921), the Sudetenland (1938), India-
Pakistan (1947), apartheid South Africa (1948), and Cyprus (1974).
33. The roots ofconflictual nationalist policy are explored by Snyder, supra note 2. See also Jack Levy,
The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, in HANDBOOK OF WAR STuDIES 259, 259-88 (Manus I.
Midlarsky ed., 1989).
34. See John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, INT'L
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policymakers is the unpalatable fact that ethnic cleavages, deteriorating into
violent conflict, are often provoked by elites within the political State to create
a domestic politicalcontext in which ethnicity is presented as the only politically
relevant identity. These elites successfully redefine the individual interests of
the population at large in the form of a threat to the community, defined in
ethnic terms, when faced with shifts in the structure of domestic, political, and
economic power.
Wippman's collection of essays grapples with many of these issues. How
should one review a book like this? Should one look at its overall structure or
just review the individual essays? It pays to look at both. A structural
examination reveals the thematic categories within which the individual essays
play their role and the particular intellectual traditions in international law that
they represent. The choice of themes discloses underlying motivations and other
significant unstated political or cultural assumptions, which either inhibit or
enhance our understanding of the role of international law in an era of
widespread ethnic conflict. The thematic approach also reveals the practical
use of the book. The post-Cold War international legal order is characterized
by pragmatism." International law currently emphasizes process, institutions,
and dialogue instead of substance, normativity, and claims. 6  Most
books-surprisingly even the international human rights books-focus
exclusively on institutions." They eschew the untidy questions of cultural
relativism, gender, and development.38
Wippman's engaging book rises to some of these challenges. Wippman
carefully divides the volume into two parts: the first, under the heading Ethno-
SECuRrry, Summer 1990, at 5; Barry Posen, Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power, INT'L
SEcuRrry, Fall 1993, at 80.
35. See PHILIPJESSU,TRANSNATIONALLAW(1956); JosefL. Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations, 51
AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1957); David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, I UTAH L.
REV. 7 (1994).
36. See ABRAM CHAYEs Er AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1986). See also Jose E. Alvarez,
Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
37. See RICHARD LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE (1995) (focusing on the U.N. and other regional organizations); FRANK NEWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS (1996) (focusing on the
law and other implementation mechanisms); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES,
TREATIEs AND MATERIALS (Francesco F. Martin et al. eds., 1997) (focusing on the treaty law and other
implementation mechanisms).
38. Importantly, one book that has done so recently is HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGTrS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLmCs, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS (1996). See
also Douglas Cassel, Teaching International Human Rights Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 215 (1997) (recounting
the deficiencies of human rights law teaching).
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Nationalism and Legal Theory, deals with the general conceptual,
philosophical, and legal issues that arise when international law is applied to an
understanding of ethnic conflict; the second part, under the heading Institutional
andPolicy Responses to Ethnic Conflict, examines the institutional competence
of the various international organizations in tackling ethnic conflict. Within
both categories, the essays include the works of highly respected authors who
write from a Western rights-based perspective as well as from critical legal
perspectives.
What does this volume leave out? As far as some of the causes of ethnic
conflict are concerned, the role of embattled political elites, using ethnicity as
a basis for nationalist claims, is not the subject of a full discussion in its own
right.39 Wippman's book should have tackled this question head on because the
general modern literature of ethnic conflict does not adequately reflect the
proper dynamics of group conflict, and it neglects to give primacy to the role of
ruling elites within these conflicts. ' It is not for lack of evidence that this
omission is commonplace in the literature. One only has to look at the Serbian
leadership from 1987 onward to see how it actively created threats to the Serbs
which it then defined and presented as external attacks on the Serbs. It
deliberately provoked and fostered the outbreak of conflict along ethnic lines.
It did so particularly in regions of Yugoslavia where interethnic relations had
been historically good.4' Indeed, Yugoslavia never was witness to the kind of
internecine religious wars seen in Western and Central Europe. Serbs and
Croats never fought until this century.42 Intermarriage rates were impressively
high.43 Yet, for all the shortcomings of scholarly analyses of interethnic conflict
in the world today, the Yugoslav crisis has presented the terrifying apparition
of what the future of international relations will be. This question thus deserves
far greater scholarly analysis than it has hitherto received. There must be no
equivocation in condemning the parody of rights of self-determination that are
being asserted here.
39. It is salutary to remember thatFernindo R. Teson's contribution does make the point, without looking
at the role ofendangered elites, that international law should not accord legitimacy to ethnic claims just because
of shared group characteristics, unless this is in response to state terrorism. WIPPMAN, supra note I, at 86-1l1.
40. See DONALD HOROWITz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).
41. See Peter Maass, "Disloyal Serbs" Share Plight of Opposition, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1992, at 1.
42. See Sergei A. Romanenko, National Autonomy in Russia and Austro-Hungary: A Comparative
Analysis ofFinlandand Croatia-Slavonia, in NATIONALISM AND EMPIRE (Richard L. Rudolf& David F. Good
eds., 1992); Ivo BANAC, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, PoLrTcs (1984).
43. For example, 29% of Serbs living in Croatia married a Croat spouse in the 1980's. See Demografska
statistika (Belgrade: Savezni, zavod za statistiku), 1979-1989 (annual) Table 5-3.
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There is also no discussion of wider cultural changes in the world today,
such as globalization. It is worth remembering that in an increasingly fluid
society, globalization brings new pressures to bear on the preservation of
distinct cultures. Cultural tensions have arisen, particularly since the 1980s,
because of new global patterns of immigration and capital flow and new North-
South relations of markets and the environment." The very factors that cause
a sense ofborderlessness also force communities to look inwardly and determine
what control they retain over their destinies.
Furthermore, Wippman and the contributors have omitted discussion of the
important links between self-determination and development. This is an
unfortunate omission, since both the United Nations World Conference on
Human Rights and the General Assembly in the 1986 Declaration on the Right
to Development has formally recognized the right to development." The
Declaration states at the outset that the right to development is "an inalienable
human right" and links it to the "right of peoples to self-determination."' It is
hardly surprising that this right has been referred to as the "alpha and omega of
human rights, the first and last right" because it is "the core right from which
all others stem."47 Moreover, there is no essay on the increasingly vexing
questions about the precise relationship between sociocultural rights and civil-
political rights."
What are we to make of the omission of these ideas and the inclusion of
others? Do Wippman's two themes tell us anything about the book's cultural
and political assumptions? Are we able to relate this back to the book's
essential structure and say that this only succeeds in turn to reflect what we
44. These are not necessarily in any way related to the new geo-political realignments following the
breakup of the former Soviet bloc. See SATVINDERJUSS, DISCRETION & DEVIATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL 28-30 (1997).
45. See Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 186, U.N.
Doc. A141/128(1986). For a detailed discussion, see some of the most challenging writings of Philip Alston,
Making Space for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3(1988);
Philip Alston, The Shortcoming of a "Garfield the Cat" Approach to the Right of Development, 15 CAL. W.
INT'LL. J. 510 (1985); Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETHER. INT'L REV. 307 (1982). See also Satvinder
Juss, Global Environmental Change, Health, and the Challenge for Human Rights, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 121, 156-59 (1997).
46. U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., supra note 45, at 186.
47. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS 1177, 1182 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
48. For a discussion in a different context, see Satvinder Juss, The Coming of Communitarian Rights:
Are "Third-Generation" Human Rights Really "First-Generation" Rights?, 3 INT'L J. DISCRIMINATION &
L. 159 (1998).
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know to be the central ideological positioning of international legal discourse?
The answer to these questions appears to be no. If we examine the individual
contributions of its authors, we find that the book succeeds in making a major
contribution to our understanding of the strengths and limitations of claims
based on ethnicity. Of course, some questions are left unresolved. But many
others are answered for the inquisitive reader. Many more are raised for fruitful
rumination. This is the ultimate value of the book.
Wippman sets the tone in an introductory chapter by explaining the
importance of ethnic conflict at the end of the Cold War. Like the other
contributions to the book, Wippman's introduction provides information that
should be more generally known, but often is not. He notes that three factors
have caused the profound changes in the international system today. First, the
demise of the rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union
has caused a proliferation of virulent ethnic conflicts and raised ethnonationa-
lism as the organizing principle in the pursuit of regional political power.
Second, the end of bipolar competition has meant that, in recent years, the
United Nations and other international organizations have been far more
willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of States, thus creating new
possibilities for great power cooperation around the world. Third, the collapse
of socialism as an alternative ideology to political liberalism reflects the
commitment of international organizations to insist on democratic governance
as a prerequisite for international legitimacy. 9 Wippman nevertheless points
out the problems for international law.
"Ethnic conflict" is not by tradition a natural category for legal analysis.
Issues of armed conflict have historically been compartmentalized along State
lines according to the Westphalian system. In legal theory, the ethnic character
of international conflicts is generally of little importance. Ethnicity may be a
feature of a minority group asserting claims to self-determination, but
membership in an ethnic group is not in itself a basis for asserting particular
claims under international law. Yet, Wippman has no doubt that "virtually all
of the central issues arising out of ethnic conflict implicate key aspects of
international law and, from a lawyer's standpoint, should be regulated by
international law.""° Indeed, these issues go to the heart of international law
because they call into question the legitimacy of States and governments. At the
same time, however, international law is faced with the intractable problem that
49. WiPPMAN, supra note i, at 1.
50. Id. at 2.
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no consensus on the definition of"peoples" entitled to self-determination exists,
since group identity remains forever contextual and subject to change.
There are two related elements, however, common to definitions of
ethnicity. First, a group invariably shares a belief in a common origin, based
on such attributes as language, race, religion, and other distinctive cultural
mores. Second, a group often shares a common culture, different from the
society at large, which imbues it with a sense of common history and forms it
into a natural community.2 Thus, the best that we can do with a definition of
an ethnic group is to say that it is a large group that adheres to a common origin
and shared culture. But one difficulty still remains. As Wippman himself
recognizes, "there is considerable truth to the view that ethnic identity is a
malleable and socially constructed phenomenon: ethnic boundaries may shift
over time; ethnic groups may be mistaken about their history and ancestry;
... and ethnic groups can be constructed and deconstructed by patterns of
migration, conquest and assimilation."53  So what is all the fuss about?
Wippman provides the answer: it is the capacity for communal solidarity and
political mobilization that makes ethnic affiliations different from other kinds
of group identifications and that forces many authors to regard ethnic groups
as "primary" and "natural" but other forms of associations as secondary. 4
Competing sources of political loyalty are preempted by the strength of ethnic
cleavages. For this reason, ethnic ties constitute a more obvious claim to
establishing independent political communities.5
The first essay of Part I is by Nathaniel Berman. 6 His essay argues for a
new international law on nationalism, based on a sense of historical awareness.
This leaves little doubt that the international legal response to ethnonationalist
claims has been tawdry, that there has been disagreement on what is meant by
the identity of peoples, and that in any event, international law has been used by
the great powers to construct identity. Berman explains this by observing that
"[i]n order to build an account of a particular nationalist conflict, international
law projects onto the protagonists a set of historically contingent
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. (quoting Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International
Perspectives, 20 ANN. REv. SOC. 49, 51, 58 (1994)).
54. See Anthony Anghie, Human Rights and Cultural Identity: New Hopefor Ethnic Peace?, 33 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 341, 345 (1992).
55. See CLIFFORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 261 (1973).
56. Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW & ETHNIc CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 25-57.
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categories-states, nations, peoples, minorities, religions, races, indigenous
peoples, individuals, and so forth-a set whose elements and valorizations have
changed over time."" Cultural assumptions, not only contested within given
periods, but also dramatically altered over time, inform the choice and
application of protagonist positions. The new law of nationalism, evinced most
prominently by the 1991 Draft Convention on Yugoslavia and the 1995 Dayton
Agreements, avoids these pitfalls insofar as it eschews complete theoretical and
doctrinal generalization, but embraces a new set of persuasive practices that
implicate contestable and contingent projections. These convention documents
are subject to competing interpretations, which involve contestable projections
of cultural difference as well as challenges to the role of culture as a legitimator
of international action.
The subsequent two essays deal with the moral significance of ethno-
nationalist claims and the normative implications when mediated through
international law. Lea Brilmayer authors the first of these essays.58 She argues
that nationalist claims are instrumentalist claims to the realization of communal
values. Respect for the demands of nationalist groups for their communal
autonomy is already a bulwark of the existing ihternational law system. The
institutional principles that have developed to protect and regulate communal
autonomy, however, apply independently of the reasons for which the
institutional principles were created. Should these two institutional principles
yield to more direct means of furthering communal interest, asks Brilmayer,
when the two conflict? Brilmayer does not think so. She rejects the argument
that an approach based on defeasible entitlements can reconcile the institutional
and instrumental views of nationalism. First, if one side is actually entitled,
then the other side must necessarily yield to its demands even where, as in the
Middle East or in Eastern Europe, there are practical reasons for a compromise.
Second, the language of entitlements predicates one side to be right and the
other to be wrong, even though rightness and wrongness are matters of degree,
especially where a compromise is appropriate.
The way forward, according to Brilmayer, is for the international
community to apply principles of correctivejustice. The principle ofcorrective
justice is already used to resolve all other problems in the international political
system, so why not here as well? It is international morality that should
57. Id. at 26.
58. Lea Brilmayer, The Institutional & Instrumental Value of Nationalism, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 58-85.
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shoulder thejob of identifying ideals. The ideal at the moment is to recognize
and promote the cause of corrective justice and to differentiate between
nationalist claims that are based on justice and those that are based on
prejudice, self-interest, or misunderstanding. This argument is morally
attractive. But is it practically feasible? We have already seen from Nathanial
Berman's essay that international law has been critical in stipulating protagonist
positions simply because they are culturally determined by those in a power to
determine them, no matter how contested or materially inaccurate these
stipulations. If international law has played a role in fixing or "rigging" ethnic
identity, it has surely also played the same role in determining questions of
correctivejustice. That is to say, its views about correctivejustice are inclined
to be distorted for the same cultural reasons. Nationalists can, at present, claim
with some historical credibility that corrective justice as a principle has
singularly been denied them, on the grounds that under international law they
are entitled to nothing because they are not internationally recognized States,
even where other political groupings have been able to assert more acceptable
claims to territorial sovereignty.
Fernando R. Teson argues in his essay 9 that group rights can only be
justified by facts and circumstances external to the group, such as the necessity
to escape State oppression or the right to vindicate prior historical title. In his
view, international law should not favor rights of ethnic groups over recognized
individual human rights simply because of the existence of shared particular
racial, linguistic, or cultural traits. Teson argues that claims to ethnonationalist
rights are flawed for two reasons. First, they assert self-determination on behalf
of groups based on nonvoluntary factors, such as some common ethnic trait.
Second, they assert that as a matter of right, political and ethnic boundaries
must coincide. Both views are false, in his view, because the definition of a
people in terms of a shared history overlooks the problem of historical
discontinuity, and ethnic identity, as a political normative principle,
differentiates between belongers and nonbelongers and paves the way toward
ethnic cleansing. Nations, in fact, are not predetermined. As Ernest Gellner has
observed, the concept of a nation is spurious.' It is the ideology of nationalism
that engenders nations, not the other way around. Languages and cultures are
59. Fernando R. Teson, Ethnicity, Human Rights, & Self-Determination, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 86-111.
60. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
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invented and reinvented selectively tojustify particular political arrangements.6
But there is also a more acceptable face of ethnic claims based on community
rights that retains the moral ends served by States. This moderate view is
Communitarianism.
Communitarianism places moral value in the group and regards collective
rights as irreducible to individual rights. Its best exposition has come from an
article in 1990 by Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz.62 They argue that the right
to self-determination is based on the wider value of self-government. Self-
government itself is justified instrumentally by reference to the self-governing
group's members. Not every group has the right to self-determination. Only
those groups that can be called "encompassing groups" have this right. These
are groups with communitarian requirements such as a common culture and a
common character. Their characteristics include mutual recognition and self-
identification by their members. Once the group has qualified, it will have the
right to determine whether it should be self-governed, but that decision will be
made in the interests of both its own members and the interests of minorities
within the group. This means that the overwhelming majority must want self-
government.63 However, under Communitarianism, self-determination is not
reducible to Liberal notions of political consent because it is "a group right,
deriving from the value of a collective good, and as such opposed in spirit to
contractarian-individualistic approaches to politics or to individual well-
being."' Margalit and Raz thus reject the nationalist approach to self-
determination because they view self-government as purely instrumental. The
nationalist perspective, by contrast, treats individual rights and interests as
derivative of, and so subordinated to, the original notion of community.
Margalit and Raz see self-government as serving the individual well-being of
group members. Their view is, therefore, very similar to that of Michael
Walzer who privileges communal integrity over political morality, but only as
a function of the rights and interests of individuals. 5
Teson disagrees with this clever synthesis of two seemingly irreconcilable
perspectives of the individual and the group. He does so by arguing that
Margalit and Raz's model is basically not liberal but communitarian. He gives
61. See id. at 55-56.
62. Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990).
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. at 456-57.
65. Michael Walzer, The Rights ofPoliticalCommunities, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 165, 181 (Charles
R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
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two reasons: first, the encompassing groups entitled to self-determination
undergo definition through terms of essentially nonvoluntary traits; and second,
since it is the collective will to self-government that counts, the ultimate good
of the group is defined as a collective good, not an individual one. For Teson,
therefore, Margalit and Raz's model is still illiberal. Teson takes this idea
further. He believes that the attempt to put individual rights alongside group
rights is misconceived. He takes issue with Communitarians like Will
Kymlicka 6 and Alan Buchanan67 who say that Liberalism can and should
accommodate group rights because what they call group rights "are really
instances of social policies that they believe should prevail over claims of
individual rights. '6 Teson is arguably incorrect in his critique. What if the
argument to group rights is based on a people's actual consent and actually
expressed preferences? If consent is a precondition of liberal theory, then
consent on an issue of self-determination must go to the identification of a right
in the liberal sense. How, then, can we meaningfully talk of non-Western
people in the Third World who do not wish to give absolute primacy to
individual rights but consent to the security and dignity afforded by
communitarian rights?69 Teson seems to be accepting consent in one context but
denying it in another. Teson's conclusions flow naturally from these premises.
There are, he says, no moral collective rights. There is no inherent dignity in
the State as a form of political organization. But there is an intrinsic dignity to
a person, as a person, that is fundamentally absent in the State, as a man-made
creation. Liberalism's commitment to universality and human commonality
mean that there is no right to be governed by members of one's own race.
There is only a right to live in freedom and equality. This governance by one's
own people is not a sine qua non. Only for weighty practical and pragmatic
reasons can collectivism trump individual rights.
So far, so good. But what are these reasons? Teson courts inconsistency
here too. Although he offers the need to avert ethnic conflict or to escape State
oppression as two such cogent reasons, he also curiously gives the desire to
vindicate a prior historical territory as another. This is inconsistent with his
framework of values. It is true that Teson poses thoughtful questions here:
How immediate was the historical wrong? How alive has the claim been kept?
66. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 34-48 (1995).
67. BucHANAN, supra note 5, at 48-52.
68. Teson, supra note 59, at 102.
69. See Juss, supra note 48.
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Are there new settlers? Has there been adverse possession? How serious was
the wrong? But to assert territoriality as a valid reason for collective rights not
only confuses historical discontinuity, but more seriously undermines that very
principle of universality and human commonality that Teson uses to reject rights
based on ethnicity. But there are also more practical reasons for opposing
arguments based on vindication of a prior historical title which Teson does not
handle. In practical terms, how far, for example, can the conflicts of Israel,
Ireland, and India be resolved on this footing?
Steven Ratner's contribution develops these arguments further under a
different guise."0 His argument is that in deciding whether the international
community should give sympathetic consideration to the demands of substate
ethnic groups who demand a revision of State boundaries, the colonial legacy
should be discarded. Colonialism postulated the doctrine of uti possidetis
implying that new States gaining freedom in Africa and Asia should adhere to
the boundaries they held at independence. Ratner argues that this anachronistic
doctrine should not govern contemporary cases of State dissolution or secession.
It will only be a recipe for disaster in the future. Instead, new States, such as
those emerging from the fall of the Iron Curtain earlier this decade, should
adopt only those boundaries that give them the optimum chance for stability and
democratic rule in the family of nations. This idea may well be right. Ratner,
however, does not discuss the fact that colonial government-however
undemocratic and lacking in respect for human rights it may have been-was
often predicated on adequate representation in the legislature of all the
composite groups of affiliations through a predetermined quota of seats. This
often helped contain and quell communal disaffection. Any new State emerging
from the wreckage of recent conflict would do well to learn lessons from this,
particularly if they contain national minorities.
The final essay in Part I is by Anne-Marie Slaughter.7' She does not ask
how international law responds to ethnic conflict, but examines the ways in
which ethnic conflict is likely to shape international law. Her approach
treats ethnic conflict as an empirical fact, a historical
phenomenon, a contemporary curse. On the assumption that
70. Steven R. Ratner, Ethnic Conflict and Territorial Claims: Where Do We Draw a Line?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHIc CoNrFucr, supra note 1, at 112-27.
71. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Pushing the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Ethnic Conflict and the "Ideal
Polity," in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CoNmucr, supra note 1, at 128-44.
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international law is the skin of international society, a set of
efforts to respond normatively and potentially coercively to a
historically contingent set of problems, the fact of international
conflict will be-is being-recorded in international legal
norms.
7 2
She focuses on the larger implications for the international legal order of group
rights and the quest for political settlement, and observes how the impact of
ethnic conflict on human rights law will mean the addition of group rights to
individual rights. Slaughter envisions that the fundamental change to the
international legal order will come from two dimensions. First, there are
emerging links in the form of a permanent structural bridge between domestic
and international institutions. This is exemplified in the links between the
International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the
domestic courts. These create quite a different architecture for the international
legal system because it forges vertical bridges from States to their supranational
counterparts. Second, there is the rise of a stylized liberal State as the "ideal
polity," designed to assure both domestic and international peace and
prosperity. This ideal polity appears, at a regional level, in the political
influence that Western European States exercise over Central and Eastern
European leaders who want to join the European Union. Slaughter sees this as
heralding a new post-Westphalian order. She rightly concludes that the
nationalism of the nineteenth century has become the ethnic conflict of the
twentieth century and that group rights will have to become international law's
long-term response to ethnic conflict. It is difficult to disagree with this
conclusion, especially given my analysis of the Dawkins case.
The first chapter in Part II is by David J. Scheffer, who looks at the U.N.
interventions in ethnic conflict situations.73 The basic problem is that State
sovereignty is still the cornerstone of the international legal system, and it poses
a formidable obstacle to humanitarian intervention. It is codified in the U.N.
Charter and it protects States from outside interference. Repressive
governments rely upon it readily. Yet, who can ignore the plight of ever-
increasing international refugees? Here the tension between sovereignty and
humanitarian intervention is particularly acute. The ethnic Albanians in
72. Id. at 128.
73. David J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CoNFLicr, supra note 1, at 147-77.
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Kosovo have been the latest group to feel this tension. Scheffer's analysis is
particularly valuable as he considers the various ways in which the United
Nations engages in ethnic conflicts. His analysis spawns hortatory
pronouncements to military interventions. He discusses the evolving legal bases
for each and every engagement. What is particularly interesting is his treatment
of humanitarian intervention. He points out that this is the most significant
action that the U.N. can take in connection with ethnic conflicts. With the end
of the Cold War and the escalation of ethnic conflicts, Scheffer believes that it
is clearly necessary to reach beyond traditional definitions of humanitarian
interventions-bothjustifiable and essential--to address modem humanitarian
challenges. He poses four critical questions. First, must there be a threat to
international peace and security for the U.N. to consider either nonforcible or
forcible humanitarian intervention? Second, what circumstances should give
rise to a right of nonforcible humanitarian intervention? Third, what
* circumstances should give rise to a right of forcible humanitarian intervention?
Fourth, is collective authorization required to legitimize forcible humanitarian
intervention? Sheffer, moreover, considers the costs of nonintervention,
nonforcibly or forcibly, in an ethnic conflict. These are questions of profound
importance and obviously Scheffer is not able to give them the kind of detailed
attention that they clearly deserve in the space of a few pages. However, all
credit is due to him for raising such weighty issues.
One may suggest here that in the current volatile situation in the world,
every effort should be made to engage in nonforcible interventions, such as:
diplomatic measures, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,
cross-border operations by non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
negotiation of relief corridors and cease-fire zones, reports to the U.N.,
prosecution of crimes against humanity, arms embargoes, air drops of food and
supplies, and so forth. The deployment of resources to this end should be a
matter of first priority given the delicate balance in the world today. Forcible
intervention should be used only as a matter of last resort, as happened in
Kosovo in October 1998, when a last-ditch negotiated settlement forestalled
military attacks against President Milosovic. Only when other measures fail
and massive loss of life is imminent should the Security Council authorize force.
The next essay is by Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes who
consider what international and regional agreements other than those brokered
by the U.N. can really do to prevent and manage ethnic conflict. 4 They look at
74. Antonia Handler Chayes & Abram Chayes, Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations
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the main international organizations and identify the relative strengths and
weaknesses that affect the way ethnic conflicts are currently resolved. Of
particular interest here are the methods developed by Organization for the
Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE), which are the most novel and
potentially the most effective. The traditional methods are based on
confrontation, pressure, and advocacy. The OSCE, by contrast, builds on its
existing structures for multilateral discussion, and it proceeds by dialogue rather
than by enforcement."' This is a role well suited to it because it blends in with
the structures of the OSCE, which provide a forum for multilateral discussion,
operating on the basis of consensus and seeking to promote security through
dialogue and not coercion.
The authors, however, also discuss the Council of Europe, which focuses
on human rights issues in the context of a more general democratic mission and,
therefore, only indirectly concerns itself with conflict prevention. Chayes and
Chayes also consider trade and investment institutions such as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). Although these institutions have a pool of economic
resources far exceeding those available in bilateral assistance programs, their
overall role has been limited in conflict resolution.76 The essay also discusses
the European Union, whose potential for resolving ethnic conflict lies basically
in the denial of membership to any transgressor country. Here, the lure of
extraordinary power, history, and values offers prosperity, peace, and freedom
on an unprecedented scale." Finally, the authors deal with international security
organizations, NATO and the Western European Union.7" NATO has
contributed to conflict prevention in large-scale peace operations, such as the
NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia in support of the Dayton agreements.
In the future, it may carry out small-scale military operations of crucial
importance, which can play a part in coordination, communications, and
logistics. As far as the latter is concerned, before the Dayton Accords,
for Managing Ethnic Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 178-210.
75. Diana Chigas et al., Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation, in PREVENTING CONFLICT IN THE POST-
COMMUNISTWORLD: MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONALORGANIZATIONS 25,27 (Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes eds., 1996). Diana Chigas is the director of the Conflict Management Group's Project
on Preventive Diplomacy in the OSCE.
76. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 74, at 191.
77. Id. at 196-97.
78. Id. at 201-07.
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traditional European security organizations had not played a significant role in
managing ethnonational conflict. They were a product of the bipolar Cold War
system and they were shaped by its history. Today, however, they are seeking
to adapt to the new post-Cold War realities; their major test is the deployment
of a force in Bosnia to implement the Dayton peace agreement. The authors
conclude by arguing that what is required is strategic mobilization and
coordination, and this is more likely to emerge from adhoc interaction among
international organizations and NGOs at work in particular situations. The
model would have to be a nonhierarchical, team-based approach bringing
together the capabilities and resources of the wide range of international
organizations and NGOs in a particular conflict area. In so concluding, the
authors are clearly synthesizing the best of the working and workable elements
in the current apparatus of international conflict resolution today.
David Wippman's essay follows next.79 He analyzes how internationally
brokered settlements, by the U.N. and other organizations, are used with
increasing frequency to preserve the territorial integrity of States deeply divided
through the medium of power-sharing among the principal ethnic groups in
those States. He offers both practical and principled reasons for advancing
consociational political settlements. On a practical level, Wippman's argument
is that such settlements are usually preferable to many other alternatives to
settling communal disputes. Ethnic conflict can turn violent. The options then
will be few and far between. Partition is often favored but is hardly the ideal
solution because it will lead to population exchanges that will be coercive and
violate human rights. On a matter of principle, Wippman argues that power-
sharing mechanisms should be adopted as some of the emerging norms that
should govern political participation in plural societies. For politically
mobilized ethnic groups, these mechanisms are the best way to achieve peaceful
democratic coexistence. Often they are the only ways in which ethnic groups
can maintain their identities and yet still participate in the life of the larger
community. Indeed, from their perspective, an exclusive focus on individual
rights can foster either an unwanted assimilation into the dominant society or
political marginalization and alienation. Wippman thus reminds us that
consociationalism is necessary because pluralist democracy is unlikely to
flourish in a society that is deeply divided along ethnic lines. Consociationalism
may be at loggerheads with Liberalism, but it is still a form of democracy. It
79. David Wippman, Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 211-4 1.
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is therefore necessary to add specific protections for minority rights to various
international legal instruments because ethnic dilemmas pose special problems.
Essays by Ruth Wedgewood, Lori Fisler Damrosch, and Michael Platzer
concentrate on how international law protects individuals and groups from
organized violence in situations of ethnic conflict. Wedgewood0 makes the
unassailable point that it is difficult to see why international law outlaws the use
of force to settle disputes between States, but not within States. International
law should surely extend, in her view, the prohibition against the use of force
contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter to civil wars as well. Lori Fisler
Damrosch s' takes this discussion further and examines the ambiguities
associated with the existing legal prohibition of genocide and the reasons why
the international community has failed to prevent and punish the culprits
engaging in genocide. Her contribution is particularly valuable because she
suggests ways in which an acceptable definition of genocide can be matched
with a more effective enforcement mechanism.
Michael Platzer,s2 in turn, deals with a problem that is inescapable in all
large-scale situations of ethnic conflict, namely, the creation of both
international refugees and internally displaced persons. Platzer argues that the
answer for the refugee crisis in any given situation has to be sought in broader
political solutions. The current use of such fashionable devices such as the
grant of temporary protection will not do. This is surely right. Most analysts
advocating temporary protection policies overlook the fact that most refugee
situations are not short-term but may go on for years, and even generations.
What Platzer's thoughtful essay does not consider, however, is the perception
of refugees as potential immigrants by the receiving territory which is
committed to maintaining strict immigration controls. This perception makes
for a more forbidding and less welcoming attitude from the wealthier northern
nations of the world, adding to the long-term plight of refugees.83
In the penultimate chapter of the book, Dianne F. Orentlicher ' argues that
80. Ruth Wedgwood, Limiting the Use ofForce in CivilDisputes, il INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CoNFuc'r, supra note 1, at 242-55.
81. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Genocide and Ethnic Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CoNFLICT, supra note 1, at 256-79.
82. Michael Platzer, Temporary Protection of a Persecuted People, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ETHIC CoNFLICT, supra note 1, at 280-95.
83. See Satvinder Juss, Toward a Morally Legitimate Reform of Refugee Law: The Uses of Cultural
Jurisprudence, 11 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 311 (1998).
84. Diane F. Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 296-325.
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the ethnic conception of nationality is inapposite in a conception of international
law today, which preserves a presumptive entitlement to citizenship based on
habitual residence in a territory. So the relevant question today is not so much
whether ethnic groups should have claims against the State, but whether States
should owe obligations to those individuals who are long-time residents in its
territory. Orentlicher takes an approach that is different from Brilmayer and
Teson, both of whom analyzed the claims of ethnic groups against States. Is
Orentlicher's approach of value? Certainly, Orentlicher provides us with a
powerful critique of the nationality laws adopted by the former Baltic States of
the Soviet Union, namely, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which have
disenfranchised groups from citizenship on ethnic grounds. Yet, as Orentlicher
herself recognizes, there is at least one international legal judgment that
suggests that the bonds of ethnicity may shape a State's naturalization laws,8"
and both the Council of Europe and the U.N. have been chary of outright
condemning the laws of these States. It is doubtful, therefore, whether there is
an unequivocal trend in favor of habitual residence as the hallmark of
citizenship laws.
The final essay is by Tom Farer." It is a fitting finale to a work that
embraces such a wide range of topics. Farer adopts ajurisprudential viewpoint.
He highlights the overwhelming importance of maintaining respect for human
rights. In addition, he contrasts the methodology of the authors in this volume
with the approaches of an earlier generation of international law scholars who
commonly adopted the Realist and Positivist approaches. Farer organizes the
chapters in this volume into four general positions and then recommends a
syncretic approach to ethnic conflict. He borrows this from Allen Buchanan's
book on secession.87 He rejects the traditional dichotomy between the Realist
and Positivist approaches. Farer asserts that "the syncretists accept no single
criterion as sufficient for the appraisal of nationalist claims.... What finally
distinguishes the syncretic approach is its insistence on weighing in every case
the interests of the dominant majority (except where they rest on predation), the
aggrieved minority, and those of third parties as well."88 In this way, Farer
85. See Advisory Opinion No. 4, Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., San Jose, No. OC-4/84 (Jan. 19, 1984), reprinted in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 161,
173 para. 60 (1984).
86. Tom Farer, Conclusion: What Do InternationalLawyers Do When They TalkAbout Ethnic Violence
and Why Does It Matter?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIc CONFLICT, supra note 1, at 326-46.
87. BucHANAN, supra note 5.
88. Farer, supra note 86, at 345.
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ensures that his approach is most acceptable to all the protagonists in a group
conflict because it is essentially characterized by compromise. Whether ornot
this will endear itself to the uncompromising who remain caught up in ethnic
disputes all over the world is, of course, a very different matter.
So what then are we to make of this book? Wippman deserves our thanks
and congratulations for compiling a book of such signal importance. His book
makes us realize the challenges that face international law today. We realize
that international law is woefully inadequate in providing the appropriate legal
responses. There is not even an established version of the right to self-
determination, even though "the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination" was first recognized by the U.N. General Assembly in 1950.19
There is no right in contemporary international law to secession even as a last
resort. Yet, international law does not prohibit revolution, civil war, or ethnic
conflict. What it does prohibit is the involvement of foreign powers in a
conflict. Why this absurdity? The reason is that the international legal
response is determined by fundamental norms. One is the right of States to
protect their territorial integrity and the other is the plainly incompatible right
of peoples to self-determination. The failure to synthesize these two norms has
contributed to the modern trend of favoring minority rights. Minority rights
preserve territorial sovereignty and yet protect the pluralism and diversity
inherent in group rights. It is the alternative to full self-determination. The
U.N. General Assembly in 1992 adopted the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious, and Linguistic Minorities
with the purpose of insisting that States should protect group identity of
minorities, who should be afforded full opportunities and political, economic,
and cultural participation in the State. The Declaration is based on a language
of individual rights, but it recognizes that the protection of ethnic minorities is
essential to "the political and social stability of the States in which they live."'
Perhaps, ultimately, the hope for mankind in the next millennium lies in the
secure protection of minority rights. It is the hope of such democracies as
89. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The 1960
Declaration on the Granting ofindependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples saw the General Assembly
define self-determination as a right for peoples subject to alien or colonial domination. See G.A. Res. 1514,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). The Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Character of the United Nations of 1970, which was adopted by consensus, again confined self-government
to the rights of colonial societies. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970). But see WIPPMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
90. G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, at 211, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
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Britain and the United States, which have hitherto escaped ethnic violence
despite sizeable group minorities. It is certainly the hope for the future
development of a coherent body of international law.

